One strike and you’re out! Dictators’ fate in the aftermath of terrorism by Adam, Antonis & Tsavou, Evi
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
One strike and you’re out! Dictators’
fate in the aftermath of terrorism
Adam, Antonis and Tsavou, Evi
2020
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/103772/
MPRA Paper No. 103772, posted 30 Oct 2020 14:32 UTC
 1 
 
One strike and you’re out! 
Dictators’ fate in the aftermath of terrorism 
Antonis Adam 
Department of Economics, University of Ioannina 
Evi Tsavou* 
Department of Economics, University of Ioannina 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Email addresses: aadam@cc.uoi.gr (Antonis Adam), e.tsavou@uoi.gr (Evi Tsavou) 
* Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Ioannina, PO Box 1186, Ioannina 45110, 
Greece. Tel.:+302651005971; Fax:+302651005092 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We use a cross-country dataset on terrorism and leadership survival 
from 1970 through 2015 to shed light on a leader’s fate after 
terrorists’ strike. We provide robust evidence that incumbents in 
electoral authoritarian regimes face an increased hazard of exit from 
political power. This is contrasted with the closed authoritarian 
dictators that remain intact. Moreover, we fail to find a robust 
effect of terrorism on a leader’s survival probability in 
democracies. We conceive this effect to be due to the collapse of the 
elite coalition in autocracies after an attack, suggesting that the 
Dictator’s “loyal friends” betray him in the aftermath of terrorism.  
Keywords: Terrorism · Political Survival · Incumbent Leaders · 
Electoral Autocracies · Closed Autocracies 
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1. Introduction 
The political survival of an incumbent depends on various factors, 
such as economic performance, size of the ruling coalition, 
institutions, etc. (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). Even though some of 
these factors depend and are determined on the leader’s actions, 
others are purely exogenous. In this paper, we examine one such 
factor, namely the effect of a security threat in the form of a 
terrorist attack on the risk that leaders face of being disposed of.  
Undeniably, terrorism poses a major security threat that may 
dramatically undermine the state’s ability to efficiently provide 
public goods and signals low incumbent competence (Gassebner, 2011). 
Thus, at least when it comes to democracies, terrorism finds resonance 
with voters and candidates alike being the main topic in political 
agenda (e.g. the 9/11 2004 US attacks) or could even override 
electoral outcomes (e.g. the 11/03 2004 Madrid bombings). And even 
though anecdotal evidence about the effect of terrorist attacks on 
the political landscape abounds, the effect of terrorism on political 
turnover in non-democracies is less examined. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only paper that examines the impact of terrorism on 
incumbents’ survival depending on the political regime is that of 
Park and Bali (2017).  
Our analysis differs from previous contributions as it explicitly 
takes into account the type of the authoritarian regimes. 
Specifically, our analysis distinguishes between electoral and closed 
authoritarian regimes, where the former are characterized by 
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inclusiveness, i.e. regular elections for both executive and 
legislative offices, and minimal competition, i.e. opposition is 
allowed, multiple parties are legal, and more than one candidate is 
allowed on the ballot, but with elections that are not free and fair 
(Schedler, 2009; Hyde and Marinov, 2012; Nurmikko-Metsola, 2020). 
Following this dichotomy, we find that electoral authoritarian 
leaders are prone to be overthrown in the aftermath of terrorism. 
This stands in sharp contrast to closed authoritarian regimes, where 
the hazard of losing office is not affected, and democratic regimes 
where there appears that terrorist attacks, at least international 
attacks, tend to stabilize the incumbent by generating a “rally around 
the flag” type effect (e.g. Brody and Page, 1975; Hetherington and 
Nelson, 2003; Chenoweth, 2010; Chowanietz, 2011; Park and Bali, 2017; 
Kuehnhanss et al., 2020).  
In our analysis, we rely on a panel dataset of 1.115 different 
political leaders from 163 countries all over the world, over the 
period 1970-2015. Our dependent variable is incumbents’ tenure in 
political office, as in Archigos dataset (Goemans et al., 2009), 
which provides details about leader characteristics, the year they 
took office, the year they lost office as well as the way they were 
discharged. Our main variable of interest, i.e. the total number of 
terrorist attacks, is taken from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) 
(START, 2018). For the countries and years in our sample, this 
database shows that there were 151.902 terrorist episodes, which 
killed over 343.111 people in total. Since our main interest rests 
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on identifying differences across regime types, i.e. democracies, 
electoral autocracies, and closed autocracies, we utilize the 
Authoritarian Regimes Dataset (Wahman et al., 2013) and we employ the 
classification of regimes as in Knutsen et al., (2017).  
Our empirical strategy is to estimate a Cox Proportional Hazards 
Regression Model (Cox, 1972), which assumes that the covariates 
multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard function. Then, we allow 
this shift in the hazard function due to terrorist attacks to be 
different across the three political regime types (i.e. democracies, 
electoral autocracies, and closed autocracies). According to the 
theoretical priors, that are set out in section 2, we find that 
incumbents in authoritarian regimes face an increased hazard of exit 
political office, compared to the effect on democrats when terrorists 
strike. Yet, further penetrating into authoritarian settings, 
electoral authoritarian leaders are prone to be overthrown in the 
aftermath of terrorism.   
To examine the robustness of our results, among other robustness 
tests we also employ a parametric GMM Poisson regression. Besides 
providing additional supportive evidence, this exercise allows us to 
address issues of endogeneity by performing an instrumental variable 
analysis. As an instrument, we use the total number of terrorist 
episodes in contiguous states (see also Braithwaite and Li, 2007; 
Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). To our understanding, this is a valid 
instrument as it has a high correlation with the endogenous variable, 
i.e. number of terrorist attacks in the respective country, and 
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additionally, it does not appear theoretical to affect the survival 
of the incumbent through other channels. The instrumental variables 
Poisson regression, then, provides additional support evidence in 
favor of our main hypotheses. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses 
our theoretical arguments and spells out the main testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and introduces the empirical 
specification. Section 4 presents the main empirical results while 
section 5 introduces the sensitivity analysis of our estimations. 
Finally, in Section 6 we provide some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Terrorism poses a major security threat that dramatically 
undermines the efficient provision of public goods, and, most 
importantly, national and domestic security (Park and Bali, 2017; 
Ezcurra, 2019). A part of the literature (Gassebner, 2011; Ashworth, 
2012; Park and Bali, 2017) has emphasized that terrorist attacks act 
as a signal about incumbents’ competence. According to this view, 
terrorist incidents endanger incumbents’ survival as they bring 
forward governance inefficiencies. Hence, after a terrorist attack, 
the incumbent might appear less powerful in the eyes of the citizenry, 
giving prominence to accountability threats, either from regime 
outsiders or from threats within the regime. 
A part of the literature that examines the factors that affect 
incumbent’s survival, has found that external conflicts have a 
 7 
 
different effect across democracies and autocracies (e.g. Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2005; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Debs and Goemans, 
2010). This differentiation is based on the idea that democratic 
leaders face greater accountability and, hence, face a higher 
audience cost than the autocrats. Based on this observation, Park and 
Bali (2017) examined the impact of terrorism on incumbents’ survival 
depending on the political regime type. Their findings indicate that 
international terrorist attacks increase the hazard of exit for 
autocratic leaders. In contrast, the democrats are relatively immune 
to the effect of terrorist attacks.  
The main idea behind this result rests on the fact that there is a 
higher affinity between the people and the leader in democracies 
rather than in autocracies (Park and Bali, 2017). Participation in 
the decision-making process, higher institutional constraints, and 
the fact that in democracies international terrorist attacks appear 
to the eyes of the people as exogenous to the regime, and more as a 
national problem, make democrats less vulnerable than autocrats 
(Choi, 2010; Park and Bali, 2017). All the above, suggest that 
democracies might, in fact, experience a rally ‘round the flag effect 
(e.g. Brody and Page, 1975; Hetherington and Nelson, 2003; Chenoweth, 
2010; Chowanietz, 2011; Kuehnhanss et al., 2020), i.e. a stabilizing 
effect of terrorism on democratically elected leaders.  
At the same time, in democracies, there is high respect for civil 
liberties, in contrast to autocracies where oppression is the rule 
rather than the exception. Further, constitutional constraints limit 
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the ability of democratic leaders to increase repression (Choi, 2010; 
Park and Bali, 2017). And, as there is a trade-off between civil 
liberties and security (Davis, 2007; Park and Bali, 2017), people in 
democracies are more sensitive in accepting policies that increase 
security at the expense of fewer liberties. In contrast, in 
autocracies, there are no external constraints on the leader in 
repressing civil liberties. At the same time, pre-existing human 
rights repression makes further in civil liberties worsening 
possible, as the regime has already created conditions which foster 
repression.   
These arguments, then suggest that terrorist attacks have two 
opposing effects on a democratic leader’s popularity and thus 
survival probability: a rally ‘round the flag effect increases 
leader’s popularity, whereas higher repression have the exact 
oppositive effect. Thus overall, the effect on a leader’s survival 
depends on the relative strength of the two effects suggesting that 
after a terrorist attack the probability of leader survival may 
increase, decrease or both effects cancel out creating a zero effect. 
However, the above arguments cannot be easily generalized to imply 
a common effect across autocracies. In fact, some autocratic regimes 
are hybrid regimes, where elements of democratic and fully autocratic 
systems co-exist. Then, we can categorize authoritarian regimes in 
electoral autocracies and closed autocracies.  
Electoral autocracies are hybrid political regimes, where parties, 
elections, and legislatures act as power-sharing devices with the 
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dictators’ ruling coalition (Schedler, 2009). Referring to electoral 
authoritarian regimes’ institutional features, electoral autocracies 
are broadly inclusive, i.e. regular elections for both executive and 
legislative offices are held under universal suffrage, and minimally 
competitive, i.e. opposition is allowed, multiple parties are legal, 
and more than one candidate is allowed on the ballot (Hyde and 
Marinov, 2012). Inclusiveness and minimal competition differentiate 
closed to electoral authoritarian regimes, while free and fair 
elections differentiate the latter from democracies (Schedler, 2002). 
Closed autocracies, at the same time, are typically personalistic 
regimes, where, in the spirit of Wintrobe (1998), there is high 
repression but also increased loyalty towards the leader. 
Taking these into consideration, we should expect terrorism to 
produce different effects on incumbent survival in electoral and 
closed autocracies, due to the presence or absence of elections. This 
stands in sharp contrast to democracies, where elections legitimize 
the government’s/leaders’ actions, hence stabilizing the regime after 
an attack, creating the rally ‘round the flag effect. On the other 
end stand closed autocracies, where the affinity of the people to the 
leader is derived by the loyalty or the fear of the population.  
In the hybrid case of electoral autocracies, when terrorists 
strike, the power of the regime supporters is in dispute. And since 
supporters are a compact group, with a common interest to retain 
political power, this group’s preferences determine whether incumbent 
dictators are going to be held accountable and their fate in the 
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political arena. This compact, well-informed, and common-interest 
group possesses strong incentives to hold political power. This 
facilitates their coordination effort to replace the incompetent 
leader to retain their status within the regime. In other words, in 
an electoral autocracy, the dictator’s “loyal friends” may easily 
betray him in the aftermath of terrorism. The reneging of the power-
sharing agreement is what drives to the collapse of elite coalitions 
from within when terrorists strike electoral autocracies. Of course, 
such forces are not present in closed authoritarian regimes, where 
there is no power-sharing device for the ruling coalition, and the 
regime is closely tied to the incumbent.  
But the presence of elections is not the only thing that 
differentiates closed and electoral autocracies. The degree of 
repression across the two regime-types is different. Electoral 
autocracies are minimally open, i.e. opposition parties face 
repression in selective and intermittent ways (Bogaards, 2009).  In 
contrast, repression in closed autocracies is massive and extensive. 
Then, the latter regime, cannot respond to terrorist attacks by 
further reducing liberties. In contrast, in less repressive electoral 
autocracies, where at least some minimal civil and political 
liberties are respected, the dictator may be tempted to try to take 
advantage of the security-civil liberties trade-off to deal with 
terrorism. Of course, even in autocracies, this hurts a leader’s 
popularity thus creating forces willing to overthrow the leader, or 
even overthrow the regime. Then, in this case as well, incumbents in 
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electoral autocracies face a higher hazard of exit. But this time, 
it is not the betrayal by the loyal friends, but their own mistaken 
policy. 
Both effects above, then, work towards the same direction. In 
electoral autocracies, the regime’s ruling coalition can easily 
dispose of the leader, to remain in power. At the same time, the 
regime can increase the level of repression above the initial minimal 
level, and extent it to more segments of the opposition. In contrast, 
in closed autocracies, the regime is closely tied to the incumbent 
and further increase in repression, in response to the terrorist 
attacks, is not possible. This results in the following two 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: In the aftermath of terrorism, incumbent leaders in 
democracies face a reduced hazard of exit political power compared 
to their authoritarian counterparts. 
Hypothesis 2: In the aftermath of terrorism, incumbent leaders in 
electoral authoritarian regimes face an increased hazard of exit 
political power, while their closed authoritarian counterparts remain 
intact.  
In the following section, we examine the empirical validity of 
these two hypotheses, and we further examine their robustness across 
various specifications.  
3. Data 
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To test the above, we use survival analysis to analyze the time to 
the occurrence of an event (Cleves et al., 2008). Survival models 
have a time-to-event approach, where time is the incumbent’s tenure 
and the event is the exit from office. The survival function gives, 
for every time, the probability of holding political office up to 
that time. The hazard function h(t), also known as the conditional 
failure rate, is the limiting probability that the failure event 
occurs in a given interval, conditional upon the subject having 
survived to the beginning of that interval, divide by the width of 
the interval (Cleves et al., 2008).  
Here we use the Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Model (Cox, 
1972), which assumes that the covariates multiplicatively shift the 
baseline hazard function. The Cox model is expressed by the following 
hazard function:  
h(t) = h0(t) * exp(b1x1+b2x2+...+bpxp) 
where t represents the survival time, h(t) is the hazard function 
determined by a set of p covariates (x1,x2,...,xpx1,x2,...,xp). The 
coefficients (b1, b2, …, bp) measure the impact of covariates, and h0 
stands for the baseline hazard. 
If we use a simple Cox proportional hazard model, and calculating 
the Proportional Hazard test, indicates that the model always rejects 
the null of proportional hazards. Calculating the test for each 
variable separately indicates that the source of rejection of the 
assumption for the whole model is due to the age variable and the 
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interaction of age and regime type. As the age variable is crucial 
for our analysis, and always included in the relevant literature 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005), we have followed Kleinbaum and 
Klein (2012) and estimated a Cox model stratified for the 
age_group*regime variable.  
3.1. Key variables 
To determine the time of entry and exit of each leader, we employ 
the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al, 2009). Archigos identifies the 
effective leader, i.e., the person who de facto exercises power in a 
country, of each independent state (Gleditsch and Ward, 1999). 
Additionally, in the data, we can identify how rulers enter and leave 
political power, the post-tenure fate of the ruler, as well as other 
personal characteristics.  
The key dependent variable Tenure, then, counts the total number 
of years that the effective leader holds political power, using the 
entry and exit dates of Archigos. In instances when multiple 
leadership changes occurred in a state in a given year, we only 
consider the first change.1  
Concerning our key independent variable, terrorism, we use the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (START, 2018). The Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) includes data on transnational and domestic terrorist 
                     
1 To deal with constitutionally determined term limits, which create 
censoring in our data, (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003), we construct the 
indicator Term Limits, using information on legislated term limits 
in the CIA World Factbook.  
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incidents, together with any information regarding each attack, e.g. 
target type, weapons used, date and location of the attack, number 
of casualties, and nature of the target, and-when identifiable-the 
group or individual responsible. Though the GTD refrains from 
establishing a single definition of terrorism, it describes a 
terrorist attack as “…the threatened or actual use of illegal force 
and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” 
(START, 2018).  
For an event to be included in the GTD database, it must first meet 
the three following base criteria (START, 2018): first, the incident 
had to be intentional—the result of a conscious calculation on the 
part of the perpetrator. Second, it had to entail some level of 
violence or threat of violence—including property violence, as well 
as violence against people. Third, the perpetrators of the incidents 
had to be sub-national actors. The GTD does not include acts of state 
terrorism. 
Additionally, at least two of the following three criteria must be 
present for an incident to be included in the GTD. First, the act had 
to be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal. The exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. 
Second, there had to be evidence of an intention to coerce, 
intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or 
audiences) than the immediate victims. Third, the action had to be 
outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, that is, the 
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act must be outside the parameters permitted by international 
humanitarian law, insofar as it targets non-combatants.  
To specify our key independent variable, we use the GTD data to 
construct Attacks that account for the total number of terrorist 
incidents per year, in a given state, including international, 
domestic, and unknown incidents. Following the relevant literature 
(e.g. Park and Bali, 2017) we use the variable in a logarithmic form, 
i.e. ln(Attack+1). Furthermore, we also decompose the variable 
Attacks in International Attacks, which includes only international 
attacks on any of the logistically, ideologically, and miscellaneous 
dimensions, and in Domestic Attacks. Finally, we create the variable 
Unknown Attacks for all terrorist incidents where incentives or 
perpetrators remain unidentified.2 
To control for regime type, we utilize the Authoritarian Regimes 
Dataset (ARD) (Wahman et al., 2013), which categorizes regimes as 
autocratic and democratic by estimating mean cutoff points in five 
categorical measures of democracy (see Wahman et al., 2013 for more 
details). To differentiate among electoral and closed autocracies, 
we follow Knutsen et al., (2017), which codes autocratic regimes to 
regimes that hold elections (electoral autocracies) and regimes that 
do not hold elections (closed autocracies), using information for the 
existence of national and executive elections from the NELDA dataset 
                     
2 In the sensitivity analysis, in order to exclude terrorist attacks 
with a low impact, we also use information provided by GTD on the 
number of total confirmed fatalities for the incident, including all 
victims and attackers who died as a direct result of the incident. 
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(Hyde and Marinov, 2012). Hence, our regime type variable has three 
categories, i.e. electoral autocracies, closed autocracies, and 
democracies.  
3.2. Other independent variables 
To correctly specify the hazard model, we also control for a wide 
set of other factors that also explain the incumbent exit hazard. 
Thus, we include the variable Previous Term, as in Goemans et al. 
(2009). This variable aggregates the number of previous tenures in 
office for the political leader, prior to its current tenure. There 
are several reasons to expect that the probability of a leader losing 
power in any given period is associated with his previous term (Bienen 
and Van de Walle, 1989; 1992): constitutional term limits, 
“incumbency fatigue” and gradual loss of popularity may all suggest 
that previous terms result into higher exit probability. At the same 
time, the previous term in office may capture independently measured 
variables (e.g. Chiozza and Goemans, 2003), such as skills, or 
leaders' ability to build political networks and to acquire and use 
information, thus we may also find that the risk of losing power 
decreases throughout leaders' tenure.  
Further, we also include a series of economic factors that is 
expected to affect leaders’ political survival (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier, 2000; Burke, 2012; Choi, 2015). First, we use the annual 
growth rate of real GDP per capita (denoted as GDP per capita growth), 
taken from The World Bank’s World Development Indicators. We expect 
that the electorate, voters and elites, will punish or reward their 
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leaders for negative or positive economic outcomes. It seems 
reasonable to expect that that higher GDP growth rate increases the 
likelihood of an increased tenure for a political leader, across all 
polities (Choi, 2015).  
As an additional control variable, we include the dummy variable 
Economic Sanctions (Marinov, 2005; Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010; 
Hayes and Cavazos, 2015), which takes the values of as 1 if a country 
was targeted by economic sanctions in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
The variable is taken from Park and Bali (2017) and is compiled based 
on Morgan et al. (2014). Foreign policy pressure in any form may 
affect incumbents’ tenure in office, by destabilizing them, since 
economic sanctions may substantially affect the welfare of the 
population and also reduce the rents from being in office for the 
autocrat (Cho, 2019).  
To measure the military power of the country, we make use of the 
Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) (Singer et al., 
1972), based on the following annual values for the total population, 
urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, 
military personnel, and military expenditure of all state members to 
control for the national capability of a given state. As national 
power increases, leaders must be insulated from the dangers of exiting 
political office.  
Furthermore, we control for the degree of the repressiveness of the 
regime by including a variable that captures the violations of 
physical integrity rights- i.e. variable Political Terror Scale 
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(Gibney et al., 2019). Political terror is defined as violations of 
basic human rights to the physical integrity of the person by agents 
of the state within the territorial boundaries of the state. Political 
terror is measured on a 5-point ordinal scale, where 5 indicates the 
maximum of the highest level of political terror and a score of 1 the 
minimum. The sign of the variable is a priori ambiguous, since the 
absence of respect for these rights may either harm the leader, by 
reducing the loyalty of the population or benefit the leader by 
suppressing the opposition.  
According to the literature that examines the significance of armed 
conflict on a leader’s ability to hold office (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita 
et al., 2005; Croco, 2011), we create indicator variables for the 
occurrence of Intra-State Wars and Inter-State Wars in a given country 
and year, as well as indicator variables for War Outcomes, i.e. win, 
loss, or draw, based on the classification of the Correlates of War 
Project (Sarkees et al., 2010). Always according to the related 
literature, we expect that authoritarian political leaders have a 
longer duration in office than leaders who govern democratic states, 
when initiating in an armed conflict, due to their reduced 
accountability to the public. 
As even the best governance and policies will not work in a country 
with political instability (Mehmood and Mehmood, 2016), we include 
the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a country 
experiences instability in the system of governance, and zero 
otherwise (as taken from Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and extended by 
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Slettebak, 2012). Prior instability is expected to exert a negative 
effect on incumbents’ tenure in the political arena.  
Last, we control for the degree of religious heterogeneity within 
a state. Fractionalization has long been hypothesized to be 
correlated with coups (Miller and Elgün, 2011), although arguments 
are at times contradictory (Jackman, 1978; Lake, 1955). We expect 
that heterogeneous societies face an increased likelihood that a 
domestic group will use extraconstitutional means to acquire power. 
Religious fractionalization is taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003), 
which use the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index from the Atlas 
Narodov Mira (1964). The data are extended by Slettebak (2012). The 
variable measures the probability that two people from the population 
chosen at random will be from different religious groups. 
Our final dataset includes data on 163 countries from 1970 through 
2015. In total, 1.115 different political leaders are included in 
this analysis. According to our data, Fidel Castro, in Cuba, has the 
longest tenure in our analysis, spanning for half a century. He is 
followed by Hussein Ibn Talal El-Hashim in Jordan and Kim Il-Sung in 
North Korea for 47 and 46 years respectively. 
Regarding terrorist attacks, we have information on 151.902 
incidents over these 45 years. Iraq in 2014 stands out, having 3.933 
terrorist incidents which killed 13.965 people, from which the 1.118 
were international, the 35 were domestic and the rest 2.780 have been 
classified as unknown terrorist incidents. 
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4. Empirical Results  
The following table presents our baseline results. 
[Insert Table 1, here] 
In the first column, the interaction of the (logarithm of) total 
number of terrorist attacks with the indicator of autocracy, 
controlling for a wide set of other factors indicates that the 
positive effect of the total number of terrorist attacks on the 
probability of exit of the incumbent holds only in autocratic 
countries. This is consistent with our first hypothesis, i.e. that 
terrorist attacks affect the tenure of democrats less than that of 
autocrats.  
As the coefficient of the interaction term represents a deviation 
from the baseline value, i.e. democracies, and as the coefficients 
from the Cox analysis do not have a clear interpretation (Cleves et 
al., 2008), at the bottom of the table, we also report the total 
combined effect on autocracies and democracies as hazard ratios. This 
effect suggests that ceteris paribus, after a terrorist attack the 
hazard of exit for the incumbent is approximately 24% higher in 
autocracies than in autocracies that do not experience a terrorist 
attack. The corresponding figure for a democratic leader is 
approximately 3%, which is, however, statistically insignificant.  
Even though column (1) is the starting point of our analysis, 
similarly stands column (2) for hypothesis 2, whereas our main 
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specification is in Column (3).  There, besides differentiating 
between democracies and autocracies, we also examine the different 
effects of terrorist attacks in electoral and closed autocracies. 
According to our findings electoral autocracies appear to exhibit a 
different effect compared to closed autocracies and democracies. At 
the bottom of the table, when we examine the combined effects on the 
hazard of exit, we find that for closed autocracies and democracies 
the effect is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, in 
electoral autocracies terrorist attacks increase the hazard of exit 
political power. These results provide evidence in favor of our two 
hypotheses.3  
The figures that follow present the Kaplan- Meier Survivor 
Functions for Democracies, Electoral Autocracies, and Closed 
Autocracies respectively. The graphs present the percentage of 
leaders that have not experienced the exit of political power for 
each value of the x-axis. The continuous line corresponds to leaders 
that have not experienced an attack, whereas the dashed line 
corresponds to the overall survival of those leaders who have 
experienced a terrorist episode. Using the data from the figures we 
find that the average year of exit is 14.07 years. Then, about 62% 
of democratic leaders that experienced an attack reach that time, 
whereas the corresponding figure for democratic leaders that have not 
                     
3 For our main model, in Column (3), Table 1, we test the proportional hazards 
assumption, using the Schoenfeld and scaled Schoenfeld residuals (see graph A1 in 
the appendix). Indeed, according to the PH-test, the covariates multiplicatively 
shift the hazard function.  
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experienced a terrorist attack is about 75%. Similarly, about 96% of 
the leaders in electoral autocracies survive up to 14.07 if they do 
not experience a terrorist attack and about 88% if they do. For 
leaders in closed autocracies, the effect is not statistically 
significant, as it is also evident in the related figure where the 
two lines are very close to each other.    
[Insert Figure 1 to 3, here] 
Regarding the rest of the control variables, according to Column 
(3), we find first, previous terms in office are associated with an 
(close to 33%) increased hazard of exit from political power for the 
incumbent as the number of previous terms in office increase. This 
is consistent with the view that suggests that constitutional term 
limits, “incumbency fatigue” and gradual loss of popularity may all 
lead to increased exit probability. Furthermore, involvement in an 
external war is associated with a lower probability of exit, 
indicating that a “rally around the flag” effect exists. For the GDP 
per capita growth rate, we find that better economic outcomes, i.e. 
higher growth rates, exert a stabilizing effect of the leader. On the 
other hand, economic sanctions and higher state repression increase 
the hazard of exit for the leader. Finally, in contrast to our priors, 
higher material capabilities increase the hazard of replacement for 
the leader, while religious fractionalization decreases the hazard 
of exit political power. The rest of the variables turn out 
statistically non-significant, at least at the conventional 10% level 
of statistical significance.  
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In the rest of the columns of Table 1, we experiment with additional 
controls. In column (4), we control for prior instability in the 
system of governance (Mehmood and Mehmood, 2016). Then, in Column 
(5), we exclude cases where the leader was expelled due to a regime 
transition. This allows us to examine whether the effect is driven 
by the fragile institutional form of the electoral autocracies, which 
balances between pure democracy and autocracy.  Thus, we keep only 
the cases where the leader was replaced by another leader within the 
same type of political regime, which is, of course, a premise of our 
theoretical hypothesis. The overall picture remains the same, 
validating our main hypotheses.4,5 
In the tables that follow we provide further sensitivity analysis. 
First, in Table 2 we decompose terrorist incidents, in international 
and domestic attacks, using the classification of GTD. 
[Insert Table 2, here] 
In Column (1), we present the results only when we examine the 
effect of international terrorist episodes, whereas in column (2) we 
examine the effect of domestic terrorist attacks. According to the 
estimated effects, international terrorist attacks have a stabilizing 
effect on democratically elected leaders. This result further 
validates a vast literature (e.g. Brody and Page, 1975; Hetherington 
                     
4 We have also added additional variables that account for loyalty and repression 
in our baseline equation. After controlling for these factors, as also suggested 
by our theoretical priors, the resulting effect of terrorism in electoral 
autocracies decreases significantly. The results are available from the authors 
upon request.  
5 The validity of Table 1 is also tested using the alternative measure of 
terrorist incidents by Enders et al., 2011, as updated in Gaibulloev and Sandler, 
2019. The results are available from the authors upon request.  
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and Nelson, 2003; Chenoweth, 2010; Chowanietz, 2011; Park and Bali, 
2017; Kuehnhanss et al., 2020) which shows that democratically 
elected leaders experience the “rally round the flag effect”. In 
democracies, civilians perceive international terrorist incidents as 
external challenges against their society and its values by outside 
non-state actors. Thus, international attacks induce patriotism and 
power projection, aspects that tend to balance out the respective 
destabilizing effect for autocrats.  Rather than blaming leaders, 
citizens seem willing to sacrifice their liberties in exchange for 
security against heightened terrorist threats (Davis, 2007; Park and 
Bali, 2017). By projecting charisma and capabilities onto their 
incumbent (Berinsky 2009; Merolla and Zechmeister, 2009; Park and 
Bali, 2017), people rally around their elected leaders and anticipate 
incumbents to effectively counter-terrorism. This is in sharp 
contrast with electoral authoritarian leaders who are vulnerable to 
international terrorist episodes.  
However, when it comes to domestic terrorist attacks electoral 
authoritarian incumbents face increased hazard of exit political 
power, indicating that domestic terrorist episodes are indeed a 
triggering effect for a reshuffling coup (Aksoy et al., 2015). Again, 
as the estimated hazard ratio reveals, closed authoritarian leaders 
remain intact and the same holds for the democratically elected 
leaders. The latter effect might appear puzzling, however, it might 
be attributed to the lowest occurrence of domestic terrorist attacks 
in democracies: in democracies, the existence of checks and balances 
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credibly constrains leaders from abusing their power (Findley and 
Young, 2011). Similarly, in democracies, the opposition can be 
expressed by non-violent means. Furthermore, according to Bali and 
Park (2014), in democracies there is a reduced incidence of 
international terrorist events in times of elections, since potential 
rally effects and armed retaliation may act as a strong deterrent for 
nondomestic groups who strategically seek to avoid these two effects. 
Further, at election times, democracies may attract fewer 
transnational incidents, due to their reduced tendencies toward high 
levels of international involvement during that period (Bali and 
Park, 2014). These effects suggest that in democracies (domestic) 
terrorism is not a form of political expression. Of course, this does 
not hold in autocracies. Thus, the result regarding electoral 
autocrats is consistent with our hypothesis: terrorism induced by 
domestic actors prompts criticism in the electoral authoritarian 
setting motivating supporter regime elites to protect the regime, but 
not the incumbent leader. 
In the rest of the columns in Table 2, to examine whether our 
results are driven by the way we decompose total attacks into 
international and domestic incidents, we also employ the database of 
Enders, et al. (2011), as updated by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2019), 
which build a database that decomposes total attacks into 
transnational and domestic incidents by applying a five-step 
procedure. As the reader can verify, both methods of decomposing 
terrorist incidents produce qualitatively similar results.  
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Table 3 provides additional robustness tests.6 In Columns (1) and 
(2), we exclude those countries that experienced either a very low 
or a very high number of attacks. Thus, we exclude 5%- Column (1) and 
the 5% most attacked countries of the less attacked countries in our 
dataset.7 Likewise, in Columns (3) and (4) we exclude the 5% of the 
countries that experienced the most fatalities, and the 5% of the 
countries that experienced the least fatalities, respectively. 
Finally, in columns (5) we exclude those countries that did not 
experience any fatalities. The thrust of our main argument remains. 
[Insert Table 3, here] 
Following recent work by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2018), in 
small coalition political systems the expectation that an incumbent 
will die soon, and so not be able to deliver future private rewards 
to his coalition of supporters, significantly increases the 
likelihood that the leader will be overthrown. Thus, such cases may 
be a driving force of our results: terrorist attacks are not the 
cause of a change in the leader, rather they coincided with a change 
of an ailing leader. Or, an issue we will also try to deal with in 
the following section as well, terrorist attacks are targeted to weak 
leaders. Hence, in Column (6), Table 3, we exclude instances when 
leaders retired due to ill health, using data on health status on 
                     
6 For the clarity of the analysis we do not present the results for all variables, 
but only the main variables of interest. The complete set of results are available 
upon request. 
7 The former are Equatorial Guinea, Costa Rica, Mongolia, North Korea, Yemen 
People's Republic, Oman, Republic of Vietnam and Turkmenistan, whereas the latter 
are Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan Colombia, Peru, India, Philippines, and United 
Kingdom. 
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exit from Archigos (Goemans et al., 2009).  Still, our results hold; 
these cases do not appear to bias our results.  
In Column (7), Table 3, we validate the robustness of our results 
excluding countries with a high share of natural resources.  The 
existence of natural resources implies that there might be rents to 
be shared by the leader and the elite. Hence, the elite might have 
additional incentives to protect the leader after an attack in 
resource-rich countries. Thus in Column (7), we exclude countries 
whose sum of revenues from natural resources, specifically oil, gas, 
coal, and metal revenues (Haber and Menaldo, 2011), surpass the 20% 
of GDP (IMF, 2012). Our results indicate that our results hold in 
poor resource countries, thus the potential existence of rents for 
the elite does not drive our results.  
As war may affect tenure, especially in autocratic countries 
(Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Debs and Goemans, 2010) and also affect 
the occurrence of terrorist attacks (Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2008; Campos 
and Gassebner, 2009; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011), in Column (8) we 
exclude countries that have been engaged in interstate war. 
Similarly, in Column (9) we exclude countries that have experienced 
any war loss, while in Column (10) we exclude instances of prior 
instability in the system of governance. Even when we do so, our main 
results remain the same. Finally, we examine the impact of suicide 
attacks on incumbent leaders’ survival in political arena. To 
determine terrorist attacks that stem from suicide attacks we use the 
total number of suicide incidents, we use those cases where there is 
evidence that the perpetrator did not intend to escape from the attack 
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alive (START, 2018). The adverse effect of suicide attacks on leader 
survival is more pronounced compared to the case of all terrorist 
attacks. More precisely, the odds ratio is 1.902, compared to only 
1.277 when we use all attacks. This is consistent with the view that 
the public may be less sensitive to every day's political violence 
that doesn't involve suicide attacks.  
In the last robustness test, in Table 4, we address issues of 
endogeneity. There might be several reasons why our results might be 
deemed biased: first, we cannot rule out the possibility of selection 
(Park and Bali, 2017; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2019). Terrorists, as 
they wish to show a larger impact of their strike, choose among 
several possible locations the one that appears less able to prevent 
the attack, i.e. the one with the least powerful leader. Of course, 
this leader might be eventually be disposed, not because of the 
attack, but instead because he is inherently weak. Similarly, 
confounding variables might also create issues of endogeneity. The 
existence of strong opposition, that has the means to overthrow the 
leader, might equally explain the change in the incumbent as well as 
explain the occurrence of domestic attacks that target the regime. 
To deal with this issue, we employ an instrumental variable 
approach. Given the paucity of quality instruments for terror 
attacks, the challenge in our case is to find a valid instrument that 
is adequately correlated with terrorism and remain uncorrelated with 
political survival and the disturbances. To this end, we follow 
Braithwaite and Li (2007) and employ the total number of terrorist 
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episodes in contiguous states. Increased terrorist incidents in 
contiguous states create negative spillover effects into the master 
country, increasing attacks, through a contagion effect (Braithwaite 
and Li, 2007; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2001). Then, any destabilizing 
effect from contiguous attacks will affect the hazard of exit only 
through the channel of the attacks in the master state.8  
To construct contiguous terrorist attacks, we add the total number 
of attacks (always from the GTD database) in contiguous states, as 
determined by the direct contiguity dataset of the Correlates of War 
Project. Since instrumental variable methods cannot be applied in a 
regression analysis with censored survival outcomes, here, we will 
specify a parametric GMM Poisson regression model.  
[Insert Table 4, here] 
Table 4 presents the instrumental variable approach using the GMM 
Poisson regression model. Indeed, in Column (1), Table 4 we may 
observe that when we instrument the number of terrorist attacks with 
the number of terrorist episodes in contiguous states, we obtain the 
same qualitative results with our main specification. In column (2) 
we also include the estimation of our main model using a simple 
                     
8 One counter argument against our instrument is that terrorist attacks in 
contiguous states are higher because terrorists can have a haven in the weak 
neighboring master state. Thus, weak leaders experience more attacks in contiguous 
states, due to selection. The literature, however, shows that the state’s defensive 
and pro-active policies create a haven for terrorists rather than geographical 
contiguity (Schneider et al., 2010). And this policy may be due to the inability 
of a weak leader to control terrorist organization which reside within its 
territory, or due to holding the same political views of the leader with the 
terrorist groups. And these states are seldom geographically related to the 
targeted states (Bahgat and Medina, 2013). Similarly, it could also be the case 
that over-supply of anti-terrorism diverts terrorist attacks to other targets. But 
even in this case, there is no evidence that these less protected areas are 
geographically contingent (Enders and Sandler, 2006). 
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Poisson model- which by construction gives similar results to the Cox 
model in Table 1, column (3).  
Moreover, according to our results terrorist attacks have no effect 
on the survival of incumbents in closed autocracies. Finally, in 
Columns (3) to (6) of Table 4, we replicate the results of Table 1, 
using the GMM Poisson model with endogenous terrorist attacks. 
Qualitatively, all results remain the same: terrorist attacks in 
democracies have a lower effect on the probability of survival of the 
incumbent. Furthermore, the effect in autocracies is driven by the 
effect on electoral autocracies.  
5. Conclusions 
Terrorism does affect targeted incumbents politically in meaningful 
ways, consisting of an important factor that triggers coups, through 
various channels. Our empirical results examine differences among 
electoral, closed autocracies, and democracies. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that undertakes such a task, 
providing a novel distinction regarding incumbent authoritarian 
leaders’ survival in the political arena. This analysis, then, also 
sheds light on the impact of the quality of governance and 
institutional coherence on the stability of the political environment 
when terrorists strike.  
According to our findings, it appears that terrorist attacks have 
destabilizing effects only in electoral autocracies. In contrast, in 
democracies, it appears that a rally ‘round the flag effect mitigates 
the effects creating an insignificant overall effect. The existence 
of this rally ‘round the flag effect is more evident when we examine 
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international terrorist attacks, where it appears that a terrorist 
attack increases a democratic leader’s expected tenure. And since we 
are dealing with democracies, this outcome can be associated with 
increased support.  
Terrorism is much more than an expression of range and intends much 
more than to instill fear and distress. In electoral autocracies, 
terrorism is a political weapon in terrorist’s hands that does work, 
as long as the ultimate goal of terrorists is to destabilize the 
leader. And even if our analysis provides evidence in favor of this 
view, it does not say anything regarding changes in policy. For 
example, following our analysis, one could examine whether terrorist 
attacks in electoral autocracies have an effect in changing policies 
regarding the respect of civil liberties and human rights, or have a 
long-run positive effect on economic policies and eventually on the 
economy. This is of course and an avenue for future research, which 
can extend the results of the present paper. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  Obs  Mean Std.Dev. Source 
 authoritarian regime 6399 0.393 0.488 Knutsen et al., 2017; Hyde and Marinov, 2012 
 regime type 5019 1.253 0.708 Wahman et al., 2013 
 tenure 6835 13.413 11.149 Goemans et al., 2009 
 age 6857 57.949 11.353 Goemans et al., 2009   
 age group 6857 1.399 0.49 Goemans et al., 2009   
 exit  6835 0.165 0.371 Goemans et al., 2009   
 term limits 6789 0.095 0.294 CIA World FactBook 
 previous terms in office  6858 0.135 0.431 Goemans et al., 2009   
 attacks 7401 1.008 1.515 START, 2018 
 international attacks 7401 0.525 0.991 START, 2018 
 domestic attacks 7401 0.442 1.096 START, 2018 
international attacks 6743 0.041 0.801 Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2019 
domestic attacks 6885 0.704 1.304 Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2019   
 fatalities 3358 1.983 2.073 START, 2018 
 suicide attacks  3128 0.118 0.502 START, 2018 
 contiguous attacks 5486 3.175 1.929 START, 2018 
 political terror scale 5747 2.516 1.143 Gibney et al., 2019 
 religious fractionalization  5593 0.378 0.218 Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Slettebak, 2012 
 prior instability 5677 0.131 0.337 Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Slettebak, 2012 
 GDP growth 6105 1.973 6.74 World Development Indicators 
 economic sanction  5114 0.227 0.419 Park and Bali, 2017 
 material capabilities index 6353 0.007 0.021 COW project 
 resources dependence 5216 6.98 13.865 Haber and Menaldo, 2011 
 interstate war 5665 0.028 0.165 COW project 
 intrastate war  5132 0.107 0.309 COW project 
 war loss 5665 0.004 0.065 COW project 
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Graph A1 - Test of the proportional hazards assumption using the Schöenfeld and scaled 
Schöenfeld residuals for Column (2), Table 1 
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Graph 1 Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function in Democracies. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2 Kaplan-Meier Survivor Function in Electoral Autocracies. 
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Graph 3  Kaplan- Meier Survivor Function in Closed Autocracies.  
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Table 1: Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Model. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Attacks 0.0277 0.0200 0.000845 0.000419 0.00128 
 (0.77) (0.54) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
Attacks In Autocracy 0.183*     
 (3.52)     
Attacks_in_Closed_Autocracy  0.168 0.190 0.184 0.227+ 
  (1.24) (1.39) (1.34) (1.66) 
Attacks_in_Electoral_Autocracy  0.238* 0.245* 0.233* 0.228* 
  (3.64) (3.74) (3.54) (3.16) 
Previous Terms in Office 0.377* 0.307* 0.287* 0.280* 0.281* 
 (4.53) (3.20) (2.98) (2.92) (2.85) 
GDP Growth -0.0232* -0.0338* -0.0338* -0.0344* -0.0359* 
 (-3.37) (-4.55) (-4.56) (-4.60) (-4.65) 
Economic Sanctions 0.320* 0.363* 0.354* 0.352* 0.346* 
 (3.13) (3.30) (3.22) (3.21) (3.05) 
Material Capabilities index 6.413* 8.832* 9.590* 9.932* 9.555* 
 (2.35) (2.93) (3.15) (3.26) (3.11) 
Interstate War -1.083* -1.926* -1.896* -1.883* -1.795* 
 (-2.39) (-2.70) (-2.65) (-2.63) (-2.51) 
Intrastate War 0.00124 -0.120 -0.0949 -0.0913 -0.163 
 (0.01) (-0.69) (-0.54) (-0.52) (-0.87) 
Political Terror Scale 0.163* 0.194* 0.194* 0.184* 0.205* 
 (3.25) (3.62) (3.60) (3.39) (3.71) 
Religious Fractionalization   -0.428+ -0.422+ -0.487* 
   (-1.82) (-1.78) (-2.00) 
Prior Instability    0.263+  
    (1.83)  
      
Treatment_effects_across_groups 
(odd ratios in square brackets) 
     
Effect on Autocracies 23.52* 
(4.35) 
{1.201*} 
    
Effect on Electoral Autocracies   29.50* 
(3.81) 
{1.269*} 
27.83* 
(3.63) 
{1.277*} 
26.23* 
(3.44) 
{1.262*} 
25.83* 
(3.03) 
{1.257*} 
Effect on Closed Autocracies   20.72 
(1.29) 
{1.183} 
20.99 
(1.30) 
{1.209} 
20.22 
(1.25) 
{1.202} 
25.66 
(1.53) 
{1.225+} 
Effect on Democracies  2.812 
(0.76) 
{1.028} 
2.022 
(0.54) 
{1.020} 
0.0846 
(0.02) 
{1.001} 
0.0419 
(0.01) 
{1.000} 
0.128 
(0.03) 
{1.001} 
      
PH chi2 test 8.04 7.36 10.70 11.31 13.55 
prob>chi2 0.5296 0.6911 0.4689 0.5021 0.2591 
Observations 3132 2822 2819 2819 2719 
 
Notes: All columns present the results of a Cox model estimation stratified by the interaction 
of age and regime type. PH chi2 test denotes the Proportional hazards test, rejection of the null 
denotes that the proportional hazards assumption does not hold. Prob>chi2 denotes the probability 
of rejecting the null hypothesis of proportional hazards. T-statistics in parentheses, odds rations 
inside square brackets.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05. 
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Table 2: Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Model. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 International 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Domestic 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
International 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Domestic 
Terrorist 
Attacks 
Attacks -0.0796 -0.0186 -0.123 -0.0398 
 (-1.62) (-0.37) (-1.61) (-0.83) 
Attacks_in_Closed Autocracy 0.236 0.261 0.0565 0.293+ 
 (0.76) (1.64) (0.14) (1.88) 
Attacks_in_Electoral_Autocracy 0.356* 0.270* 0.603* 0.298* 
 (3.42) (3.57) (3.95) (3.48) 
Religious Fractionalization -0.533* -0.464* -0.644* -0.591* 
 (-2.30) (-1.97) (-2.48) (-2.25) 
Previous Terms in Office 0.283* 0.290* 0.221+ 0.212+ 
 (2.94) (3.00) (1.91) (1.83) 
GDP Growth -0.0326* -0.0350* -0.0261* -0.0275* 
 (-4.45) (-4.65) (-2.99) (-3.03) 
Economic Sanctions 0.403* 0.346* 0.371* 0.354* 
 (3.66) (3.12) (3.12) (2.97) 
Material Capabilities Index 10.63* 10.45* 5.550 5.226 
 (3.57) (3.45) (1.49) (1.38) 
Interstate War -1.926* -1.834* -2.417* -2.314* 
 (-2.69) (-2.57) (-2.40) (-2.30) 
Intrastate War 0.0177 -0.0735 0.0322 0.00180 
 (0.10) (-0.41) (0.17) (0.01) 
Political Terror Scale 0.211* 0.214* 0.242* 0.237* 
 (3.99) (3.94) (4.11) (3.91) 
     
Treatment effects across groups (Odds ratios 
in squarebrackets) 
    
Effect on 
Electoral Autocracies 
31.84* 
(2.53) 
{1.428*} 
28.64* 
(3.37) 
{1.311*} 
61.63* 
(2.74) 
{1.827*} 
29.45* 
(2.88) 
{1.347*} 
Effect on 
Closed Autocracies 
16.93 
(0.47) 
{1.266} 
27.47 
(1.41) 
{1.299} 
-6.402 
(-0.17) 
{1.058} 
28.82 
(1.49) 
{1.340+} 
Effect on 
Democracies 
-7.655+ 
(-1.68) 
{0.923} 
-1.844 
(-0.38) 
{0.982} 
-11.54+ 
(-1.71) 
{0.885} 
-3.902 
(-0.84) 
{0.961} 
     
PH chi2 test 14.03 10.42 3.70 4.10 
prob>chi2 0.2311 0.4927 0.9780 0.9669 
Observations 2819 2819 2315 2315 
        
Notes: See Table 1. 
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Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazards Regression Model for Robustness Checks. 
(Exponential Coefficients) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Less 
Attacked 
Most 
Attacked 
Most 
Fatalities 
Least 
Fatalities 
Zero 
Fatalities 
Chronic 
Illness  
Poor-Resources 
Counties  
Interstate 
War 
War 
Loss 
Prior 
Instability 
Suicide 
attacks 
Attacks 0.999 1.030 1.005 0.991 1.027 0.996 0.999 1.001 1.001 0.992 0.960 
 (-0.03) (0.67) (0.11) (-0.23) (0.64) (-0.11) (-0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (-0.20) (-0.19) 
Attacks_in_Closed_Autocracy 1.183 1.225 1.185 1.195 1.174 1.218 1.216 1.207 1.207 1.010 1.473 
 (1.21) (1.46) (1.22) (1.28) (1.20) (1.38) (1.31) (1.37) (1.38) (0.06) (0.43) 
Attacks_in_Electoral_Autocracy 1.284* 
(3.80) 
1.235* 
(2.94) 
1.250* 
(3.07) 
1.293* 
(3.90) 
1.231* 
(3.02) 
1.274* 
(3.67) 
1.310* 
(3.93) 
1.260* 
(3.50) 
1.274* 
(3.69) 
1.324* 
(3.66) 
1.902+ 
(1.71) 
            
PH chi2 test 11.77 6.22 6.31 11.45 9.89 11.02 5.60 6.85 15.65 11.56 17.12 
Prob>chi2 0.3814 0.8585 0.8522 0.4064 0.5399 0.4419 0.8988 0.7393 0.1546 0.3976 0.1043 
Observations  2763 2663 2691 2717 2346 2722 2456 2755 2816 2482 1526 
Notes: The table presents the results of a Cox model, only for the main variables of interest. The results for the rest of the variables 
are available upon request.  All coefficients are in odds ratios. See also the notes in Table 1. 
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Table 4: Parametric GMM Poisson regression model. 
 (1) 
GMM 
Poisson 
(2) 
Poisson  
(3) 
GMM 
Poisson 
(4) 
GMM 
Poisson 
(5) 
GMM 
Poisson 
(6) 
GMM 
Poisson 
Attacks 0.140 0.0268 0.148 0.140 0.133 0.143 
 (1.17) (0.49) (1.53) (1.46) (1.09) (1.18) 
Attacks in Autocracy   0.424*    
   (2.45)    
Attacks_in_Closed_Autocracy 0.254 0.209  0.251 0.236 0.129 
 (0.49) (1.10)  (0.48) (0.46) (0.25) 
Attacks_in_Electoral_Autocracy 0.485+ 0.243+  0.485+ 0.501* 0.544+ 
 (1.91) (1.82)  (1.86) (2.01) (1.86) 
Age_Group60-*Closed Autocracy 0.776 0.654  0.777 0.810 1.143* 
 (1.50) (1.02)  (1.51) (1.59) (1.99) 
Age_Group60+*Closed Autocracy 0.0171 0.688  0.0160 -0.0589 -0.0629 
 (0.02) (0.86)  (0.02) (-0.06) (-0.06) 
Age_Group60-*Electoral Autocracy -0.372 0.706  -0.374 -0.408 -0.645 
 (-0.35) (0.66)  (-0.35) (-0.39) (-0.53) 
Age_Group60+*Electoral_Autocracy 3.057* 2.895*  3.051* 3.051* 3.281* 
 (4.03) (3.41)  (4.05) (4.10) (4.32) 
Age_Group60-*Democracy 2.912* 2.994*  2.908* 2.912* 3.141* 
 (3.78) (3.97)  (3.79) (3.85) (4.09) 
Religious Fractionalization 0.00502 -0.358   0.0228 -0.00101 
 (0.01) (-0.84)   (0.06) (-0.00) 
Previous Terms in Office 0.304* 0.0691 0.390* 0.305* 0.300* 0.298* 
 (3.09) (0.17) (4.52) (3.20) (3.03) (3.00) 
GDP Growth -0.0381* -0.0320* -0.0272* -0.0379* -0.0384* -0.0402* 
 (-4.63) (-3.38) (-2.80) (-4.63) (-4.65) (-4.63) 
Economic Sanctions 0.271+ 0.387* 0.278* 0.273* 0.275* 0.251+ 
 (1.91) (2.63) (2.29) (1.97) (1.97) (1.84) 
Material Capabilities Index 5.629 8.088 5.005 5.648 6.023 6.318 
 (1.35) (1.27) (1.40) (1.48) (1.43) (1.45) 
Interstate War -1.991* -1.861* -1.361* -1.988* -1.982* -1.912* 
 (-3.11) (-2.52) (-2.85) (-3.12) (-3.10) (-2.97) 
Intrastate War -0.485 0.214 -0.385 -0.484 -0.497 -0.625+ 
 (-1.51) (0.62) (-1.64) (-1.58) (-1.52) (-1.80) 
Political Terror Scale 0.112 0.121 0.0444 0.112 0.108 0.130 
 (1.21) (1.53) (0.48) (1.27) (1.21) (1.53) 
Prior Instability     0.210  
     (1.13)  
Age_Group60+*Autocracy   -0.107    
   (-0.61)    
Age_Group60-*Democracy   2.480*    
   (6.90)    
Age_Group60+*Democracy   2.318*    
   (5.99)    
       
Effect on Autocracies   77.06*    
Effect on Electoral Autocracies 86.78+ 30.94*  86.70+ 88.47+ 98.80 
Effect on Closed Autocracies 48.20 26.56  47.81  44.60 31.25 
Effect on Democracies 15.01 2.721 15.90 14.99 14.19 15.33 
Observations 2256 2828 2488 2259 2256 2175 
 
Notes: See notes in Table 1 
